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I. INTRODUCTION
State tax systems may seem like an odd place to look for social
justice reform strategies. Yet, in the United States, state and local
governments frequently use tax law to remedy “injustices in areas in
which traditionally subordinated groups are often vulnerable.”1 The
federal tax system, in particular, has long been used to remedy
“poverty, access to housing, . . . hunger, and access to health care.”2 A
large body of research analyzes and critiques these federal programs,
which have both promising bright spots and glaring gaps.3 Such
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1
W. Edward Afield, Social Justice and the Low-Income Taxpayer, 64 VILL. L. REV. 347,
358 (2019).
2
Id. See, e.g., Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791
(2014) (describing the use of federal taxation as an anti-poverty tool); Tracy A. Kaye,
Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871
(1993) (describing how federal tax law is used to promote access to affordable
housing); Afield, supra note 1, at 368–69 (describing how federal tax law is used to
provide sustenance).
3
Recent legal scholarship analyzing tax-based transfer programs that target lowincome communities include: Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Revolutionizing Redistribution: Tax
Credits and the American Rescue Plan, 131 YALE L.J.F. 535 (2021); Jacob Goldin, Tax
Benefit Complexity and Take-up: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax Credit, 72 TAX L. REV.
59 (2018); MICHELLE LYON DRUMBL, TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR: A CALL FOR
REFORM (2019); Susannah Camic Tahk, Converging Welfare States: Symposium Keynote, 25
WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 465 (2019). Recent legal scholarship analyzing
federal tax incentives that target places where low-income communities live and work
include: Brandon M. Weiss, Opportunity Zones, 1031 Exchanges, and Universal Housing
Vouchers, 110 CAL. L. REV. 179 (2022); Michelle D. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification: A
Spatial Analysis of Place-Based Tax Incentives, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 163 (2021)
[hereinafter Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification]; Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax
Incentives Can Reduce Geographic Inequality, 74 TAX L. REV. 1 (2020) [hereinafter Layser,
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research often recommends reforms that would be initiated by federal
legislators. But in the current political and legal climate, Congress is
often stuck in partisan gridlock,4 and the balance of power is
increasingly tilting toward the states.5 For these reasons, this Article
proposes an alternative social justice tax reform strategy that targets
states—not Congress—as the initiators of national reform.
The proposed strategy relies on the theory of “reverse
federalism.”6 Recall that a key feature of federalism is the opportunity
for states to act as laboratories to experiment with policies, allowing
the federal government to learn about policy outcomes prior to
adopting federal laws.7 In a reverse federalist system, states no longer
serve as “‘laboratories’ of democracy . . . but rather as ‘repair shops,’
replacing a declining federal regime with a revised state-by-state
system” that is informed by the federal experience with policies.8 This
Geographic Inequality]; Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 82 (2020); Tracy A. Kaye, Ogden Commons Case Study: A Comparative Look at the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit and Opportunity Zone Tax Incentive Programs, 48 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1067 (2020); Kirk McClure, Anne R. Williamson, Hye-Sung Han & Brandon M.
Weiss, The LIHTC Program, Racially/Ethnically Concentrated Areas of Poverty, and HighOpportunity Neighborhoods, 6 TEX. A & M J. PROP. L. 89 (2020); Blaine G. Saito,
Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX REV. 451
(2019).
4
Jonathan Weisman, Congress Ends “Horrible Year” with Divisions as Bitter as Ever,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/18/us/politics
/congress-gridlock-democracy.html (describing legislative setbacks in 2021). But see
Jeb Barnes, Debunking the Myth of Legislative Gridlock, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 17,
2021),
https://theconversation.com/debunking-the-myth-of-legislative-gridlock154329 (arguing that congressional paralysis is better described as a “legislative
stalemate,” and inaction with respect to social policy constitutes a “policy drift” that
has shrunk the social safety net).
5
Perhaps the most salient evidence of this shift is the Supreme Court’s recent
decision to overturn Roe v. Wade. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 144 S.
Ct. 2228, 2284 (2022). In the tax context, recent examples include South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (expanding the constitutionally permissible scope
of the State’s tax nexus in the context of remote sellers) and Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (limiting a taxpayer’s ability to sue states in other states’
courts).
6
See, e.g., Jake Laperruque, Preserving the Right to Obscurity in the Age of Facial
Recognition, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report
/preserving-right-obscurity-age-facial-recognition/?agreed=1.
7
Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J.
1267, 1304 n.54 (2013).
8
Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of Reproductive
Rights, 88 B.U. L. REV. 175, 180 (2008). See also Julianna Meely, Federal Execution
Protocols: Lessons Learned in Grammar and Reverse Federalism, 24 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV.
137, 164 (2021) (arguing that in the execution context, “‘reverse federalism’ has
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Article explores how state tax systems can function as an important
corrective to federal law that promotes social justice reform.
In doing so, this Article revisits a familiar administrative feature of
state income tax law—federal-state tax conformity—through a reverse
federalism lens. Federal-state tax conformity refers to the process by
which states incorporate aspects of federal law into their state income
tax codes.9 As explained in more detail below, states may choose to
adopt federal definitions of income, or they may simply enact statelevel tax laws that parallel federal laws. Even when state law does
“conform” to the federal law, however, differences may arise when a
state legislature declines to adopt all aspects of federal law, or when a
state enacts legislation to partially decouple from the federal law.10
These acts of “disconformity,” when state tax laws are derived
from—but are not identical to—federal law, are key to
operationalizing the reverse federalism potential for state tax reform.
Ultimately, reverse federalist reform strategies rely on states to push
national policy, either by encouraging lateral conformity across states
or by spurring changes to federal law.11 Where others have argued that
disconformity can help minimize federal encroachment on state tax
systems,12 this Article argues that strategic disconformity can help push
national policy and promote social justice goals. This theory of
disconformity shifts the focus away from its defensive role within a
federalist system, highlighting its capacity to serve as a powerful
corrective to federal law.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains how states
incorporate versions of federal tax laws into their tax codes and how
states can use selective departures from federal law to fight injustice.
To demonstrate, Part II revisits states’ historic responses to the taxation
blossomed,” and it is possible for the federal government to lead by example so that
states can follow “not because they must, but because they can”); Sheldon H. Nahmod,
State Constitutional Torts: Deshaney, Reverse-Federalism and Community, 26 RUTGERS L.J.
949, 953 (1995) (arguing that “constitutional torts present a valuable ‘reversefederalism’ opportunity for the states to learn from the federal experience what to do
(and what not to do) regarding state constitutional torts and affirmative state
constitutional duties”).
9
See Mason, supra note 7, at 1269.
10
“Decoupling” is a process whereby state legislators amend state tax law to ensure
that it does not incorporate federal law. Id. at 1271–72.
11
See Lapperruque, supra note 6.
12
Mason, supra note 7, at 1336–37 (describing how states can prevent federal
encroachment on state autonomy and protect their own interests in the national policy
arena by decoupling).
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of same-sex partners prior to federal recognition of same-sex marriage,
applying a reverse federalist frame. This Article then turns to modern
examples. Part III describes how states have enacted versions of three
federal tax laws: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Child Tax
Credit (CTC), and the Opportunity Zones tax preference. A key
insight in this Article is that states can learn what works (and what does
not work) from the federal experience of laws like these to achieve
their desired policy goals. Part IV applies that insight and argues that
selective federal-state disconformity informed by the federal
experience may be an effective social justice reform strategy.
II. TAX DISCONFORMITY AND REVERSE FEDERALISM
A. A Brief Introduction to Tax Base Conformity
Nearly every state tax code incorporates federal income tax law to
some degree through a process called federal-state “tax base
conformity.”13 By harmonizing state and federal tax law, tax base
conformity minimizes differences between state and federal tax
bases.14 In addition, states’ widespread use of conformity minimizes
differences among states’ tax bases.15 This has benefits for both states
and taxpayers. Conformity “eases taxpayer compliance, enhances state
enforcement efforts, and conserves state legislative resources.”16 It also
provides a unique opportunity for reformers. To show why, this Part
revisits the concepts of tax base conformity, and more significantly,
disconformity, through a reverse-federalism lens. It begins with the
basics.
States take different approaches to tax base conformity, but a
common approach under state law is to adopt a federal definition of
income (either adjusted gross income or taxable income) as the
starting point for state-level adjustments (e.g., additions and
subtractions).17 A consequence of tax base conformity is that federal
tax preferences structured as deductions or exemptions, which affect
the federal definitions of income, may be incorporated into state tax

13

See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 423
(2010) (“The availability of the federal income tax base as a starting point in
calculating state tax liability is an unqualified benefit.”).
14
Mason, supra note 7, at 1279.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1275–76.
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law.18 Tax credits, on the other hand, are not incorporated through
tax base conformity because they do not affect the federal definition
of income.19 As explained below, however, states frequently enact their
own versions of federal tax credits, often with a high degree of
conformity to federal law.
Mechanically, states may take any one of three approaches to tax
base conformity: rolling, static, or selective.20 In states that use rolling
conformity, the state tax code automatically conforms to the current
version of the federal tax code as it is amended.21 On the other hand,
in states that adopt static conformity, amendments to federal law are
not automatically incorporated into the state tax code.22 Instead, the
state law conforms to elements of the Internal Revenue Code as it
existed on a particular date.23 Accordingly, when changes are made to
federal tax law, state legislators must decide whether to amend the tax
code to conform with the most updated version of the Internal
Revenue Code. Finally, in selective conformity states, the law only
conforms to select provisions in the federal law.24 When the federal
law is amended, legislators in selective conformity states must review
the changes and determine whether corresponding changes should be
made in state tax law.25 If they conclude that the change should be
made, they enact legislation to amend the state tax law.
In addition to tax base conformity, some states adopt laws that
mirror provisions in federal law that do not affect the tax base. For
example, some states require election conformity, whereby taxpayers
must use the same filing elections (e.g., married filing jointly, married
filing separately) for state tax purposes as they used to file their federal
taxes.26 Some states conform to federal administrative requirements,
18

Id.
See id. at 1274 (noting that “the default under base conformity is that states do
not incorporate federal [tax] credits”).
20
Jared Walczak, Toward a State of Conformity: State Tax Codes a Year After Federal Tax
Reform, TAX FOUND. 3 (Jan. 28, 2019), https://files.taxfoundation.org
/20190201130844/Toward-a-State-of-Conformity-State-Tax-Codes-a-Year-AfterFederal-Tax-Reform-FF-631.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See id. at 3–4.
26
See generally Heather M. Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections & Federal/State
Conformity, 32 VA. TAX REV. 527 (2013) (discussing the policy implications of election
conformity).
19
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such as the requirement that taxpayers provide a social security
number to claim certain tax credits, or that taxpayers without a social
security number provide an Individual Taxpayer Identification
Number (ITIN).27 And many states engage in what might be referred
to as “tax credit conformity,” whereby states enact tax credits that
mirror and supplement analogous federal tax credits.28 Tax credit
conformity may result in state-level tax credits that are identical to
federal law, or they may significantly diverge to constitute separate
stand-alone programs.
B. Disconformity and Reverse Federalism
1. The Theory
Despite its prevalence, federal-state tax conformity has been
subject to rigorous federalist critiques. In the leading article on this
topic, Professor Ruth Mason explains:
When states conform to the federal tax base, they cede to the
federal government at least three types of authority. First,
they relinquish the ability to determine structural and definitional aspects of their income taxes, such as whether to tax
imputed income and how to treat married taxpayers. Second, they cede authority to determine tax incentives. Finally,
tax-base conformity allows the federal government to set the
policy agenda for state income taxation.29

27
See Francine Lipman, State and Local Tax Takeaways Redux, 101 TAX NOTES STATE
683, 684 (discussing exceptions to the general rule that states follow the federal rule
that requires taxpayers to furnish a social security number to claim state earned
income tax credits). Note that several states have recently amended their laws to
permit ITIN filers to claim the earned income tax credit. Id. See also, Jacqueline Lainez
Flanagan, Reframing Taxigration, 87 TENN. L. REV. 629, 655 n.107 (2020) (“[t]he ITIN,
introduced in 1996, allows those without a valid SSN to file federal and state returns.”).
28
See Mason, supra note 7, at 1278 (“Many states also incorporate federal tax
credits.”). Unlike deductions and exemptions, tax credits do not affect the federal
definitions of income that are the starting point of federal-state tax base conformity.
See id. at 1334–35. Federal taxpayers determine their taxable income (the definitional
step that ultimately defines the federal tax base), and then they calculate their tax
liability using the relevant tax rates applied to that base. Id. Federal tax credits are
applied after these steps are completed, reducing taxpayers’ final tax bill on a dollarfor-dollar basis. Id. at 1335. For these reasons, tax credits are never automatically
incorporated into states’ definitions of income through tax base conformity. Id. at
1336. Instead, states that wish to adopt state-level tax credits that parallel the federal
laws must affirmatively enact legislation to implement the laws. See id. at 1274, 1278.
29
See id. at 1278, 1289.
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In other words, federal-state tax conformity results in a loss of state
autonomy that may have significant consequences for federalism. For
example, it may result in a democratic loss for state residents whose
policy preferences are supplanted by federal policy.30 It may
“undermine[] the ability of state voters to hold their representatives
accountable for unwanted tax policies.”31 And it may “erode[] another
traditional benefit of federalism: that federalism allows the states to
conduct regulatory experiments.”32
No state, however, is required to conform to federal tax law. Within
Constitutional restraints, all states are free to implement tax laws that
make sense for their jurisdiction.33 In states that use static or selective
approaches to conformity,34 departures from federal law may be as
simple as inaction: by failing to affirmatively adopt federal law, they
effectively depart from it. In states with rolling conformity, the state
legislature must take affirmative steps to reject federal law.35 Professor
Mason has argued that selective decoupling from federal tax law in
these ways “crucially safeguards state tax autonomy . . . while at the
same time allowing states to secure most of the administrative benefits
of conformity.”36 In other words, to the extent the federal-state
conformity threatens federalist values, disconformity can be
understood as a defense against federal encroachment on state
autonomy.
But the value of disconformity is not limited to its defensive role.
Rather, disconformity may be an essential mechanism to effectuate
national change through reverse federalism. States can piggy-back
on—and then improve upon—established federal programs to
increase their effectiveness and responsiveness to state and local need.
Armed with knowledge about the experience and outcome of federal
laws, states can use strategic disconformity to improve distributive
30

Id. at 1301.
Id.
32
Id. at 1304.
33
Darien Shanske, States Can and Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law, 45
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 543, 543–46 (2019).
34
See Jared Walczak, Toward a State of Conformity: State Tax Codes a Year After Federal
Tax Reform, TAX FOUND. FISCAL FACT NO. 631 3–4 (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://taxfoundation.org/state-conformity-one-year-after-tcja (explaining that in
static conformity states, states must conform to the federal tax year by enacting
legislation, and in selective conformity states, states only conform to select provisions
in the federal tax code).
35
See id. at 3.
36
Mason, supra note 7, at 1313.
31
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outcomes or provide more equal treatment of persons who face
injustice under federal law. At a minimum, disconformity has the
potential to improve outcomes in the state adopting the change. Yet,
a key insight of this Article is that disconformity also has the potential
to spur national change as other states follow in suit.
This may happen for at least two reasons. The first reason is
rooted in federalism itself. Namely, when one state adopts a legal
change, other states have the “opportunity . . . to learn from one
another by observing the consequences of a policy in another state
before adopting the policy themselves.” 37 The second reason is rooted
in economic theories that predict that jurisdictions’ regulatory and tax
policies affect residents’ location choices.38 Specifically, when policies
adopted by one state have economic effects on other states, it may
encourage competition among the states.39 Together, these dynamics
may encourage national trends in state law. As one group of
researchers explains, “[a]lthough learning and economic competition are
fundamentally different forms of intergovernmental relations, both
result in the diffusion of policy across states—i.e., in a process in which
the policy choices of one state are influenced by the choices made by
others.” 40
This theory of legal change suggests that advocates pushing for
federal tax reforms can instead target states, beginning with those that
are most likely to be receptive. The initial goal of such reforms would
be to encourage disconformity to aspects of federal law. In some cases,
federal law may be so problematic that states should be encouraged to
fully decouple from the law. In other cases, the federal law may have
significant positive outcomes that can be leveraged through
conformity—but the state could nevertheless improve upon the law
through partial decoupling. Once a critical number of states have
adopted these changes and experienced positive outcomes, other
states may follow, helping to advance a national policy via the states.
Ultimately, such changes may also lay the groundwork necessary to
generate political support for federal reforms. The next section turns
to a historical case as evidence that federal-state tax disconformity has
the potential to promote social justice nationally.
37

Brady Baybeck et al., A Strategic Theory of Policy Diffusion via Intergovernmental
Competition, 73 J. POL. 232, 232 (2011).
38
See Kirk J. Stark & Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know About the Interstate Economic
Effects of State Tax Incentives?, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 133, 154–55 (2006).
39
Baybeck et al., supra note 37, at 232.
40
Id.
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2. Historical Evidence
A particularly salient historical example of how strategic
disconformity has spurred national change can be seen in states’ tax
laws prior to the federal recognition of same-sex marriages. Prior to
2013, the federal government did not recognize same-sex marriages,
even if they were valid under state law.41 In other words, many samesex couples were treated as married under state law but single under
federal law.42 This had tax consequences. Since same-sex marriages
were not recognized at the federal level, same-sex couples were
prohibited from filing joint tax returns.43 For many couples, the
inability to file jointly resulted in them experiencing higher (or lower)
tax liability than similarly situated opposite-sex married couples.44 This
unequal treatment violated both vertical and horizontal equity
principles, and it violated many peoples’ senses of social justice.45 Yet,
federal law that defined “marriage” as between a man and a woman
necessitated this outcome under federal tax law.46
States, on the other hand, were not obligated to conform to the
federal tax filing status rules—and several chose to decouple. By 2009,
“eight states—California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont—plus the District of
Columbia permit[ed] same-sex spouses or partners to file joint state

41
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 752, 775 (2013) (striking down
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage for federal purposes
as between a man and a woman).
42
Michelle D. Layser, Tax Justice and Same-Sex Domestic Partner Health Benefits: An
Analysis of the Tax Equity for Health Plan Beneficiaries Act, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 73, 79 (2009).
43
Id.
44
The unequal outcomes are caused by the so-called marriage bonus or marriagepenalty that results when taxpayers switch from single filing status to joint filing status.
Many married couples will experience a marriage bonus when they file jointly. A
“marriage bonus occurs whenever a married couple pays less in federal income taxes
as a result of being married than they would have paid had they remained single,” and
it is “largely a result of the different tax brackets used by single taxpayers and married
taxpayers.” Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in
Black and White, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287, 288 (1999). In practice, a marriage
bonus is most likely to occur when one spouse has significantly more income than their
partner. In contrast, when both spouses have similar income levels, they may
experience a marriage penalty, whereby they face higher taxes when filing jointly than
they would have faced if single.
45
See Layser, supra note 42, at 101 (describing the tax equity implications of
treating same-sex and opposite-sex marriages differently).
46
See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752.
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tax returns.”47 Of these states, all but three—Massachusetts, Iowa, and
New Hampshire—would have otherwise required election conformity,
whereby taxpayers who filed as single individuals for federal tax
purposes would be required to make the same election for state
purposes.48 Nevertheless, these states chose to decouple in the context
of same-sex spouses, allowing taxpayers to choose a different filing
status under state law.
For the following reasons, this example illustrates how
disconformity can serve as both a defense of federalism and as an
example of reverse federalism. First, decoupling to reject the federal
definition of marriage defended federalism by maintaining state
autonomy and providing more complete recognition of same-sex
marriage under state law. Second, such strategic decoupling also
reflected reverse federalism in that it served to mitigate injustice
caused by federal law and set the stage for national change. Where
federal law created clear inequities between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples—unequal treatment that would later be found
unconstitutional and a violation of fundamental rights49—states that
allowed same-sex couples to file jointly recognized the full equality of
47

Layser, supra note 42, at 81–82.
See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18521(a)(1) (West 2006) (providing that taxpayers
generally must use the same filing status for California state law as they use for federal
tax filing); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-702(c)(1) (2012) (“Any husband and wife who elect
to file a joint return under the federal income tax for any taxable year shall be required
to file jointly with respect to such taxable year for purposes of this chapter.”); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 54A:8-3.1(c) (2021) (specifying that if the tax liabilities of a husband and wife
are determined on a joint return for federal income tax purposes, they must also file
a joint tax return for New Jersey state tax purposes); OR. ADMIN. R. § 150-316-0150(1)
(2017) (specifying the general rule that filing status for taxpayers’ federal return
determines their filing status under Oregon state tax law); VT. DEP’T OF TAXES,
TECHNICAL BULLETIN TB-55 (2010), https://tax.vermont.gov/sites/tax/files
/documents/TB-66.pdf (discussing the general rule of filing status election
conformity and the exception for same-sex spouses in 2010). Iowa law specifies that
married taxpayers who file a joint return with the IRS “may file a joint return with the
Iowa department of revenue,” but does not specifically require election conformity.
See IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 701-39.4 (2022). Similarly, in Massachusetts, taxpayers’ state
filing status may differ from their federal filing status. See Learn About Filing Status on
Massachusetts Personal Income Tax, MASS. DEP’T OF REV. (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/learn-about-filing-status-on-massachusettspersonal-income-tax. Note that New Hampshire does not have a personal income tax;
the state does not require election conformity when filing dividend and interest tax
returns. See Frequently Asked Questions – Interest & Dividend Tax, N.H. DEP’T OF REV.
ADMIN., https://www.revenue.nh.gov/faq/interest-dividend.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2022) (specifying that if one spouse is a nonresident, no joint tax return is required).
49
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).
48
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same-sex marriages. For same-sex couples seeking full equality under
the law, this was a step in the right direction.
Due to disconformity in these states, however, same-sex married
couples often had a dual filing status, whereby they were obligated to
file as single individuals under federal law, but they were permitted to
file with married-filing-jointly status under state law. The process was
onerous. Where opposite-sex taxpayers benefited from the simplicity
of federal-state tax conformity—whereby they could calculate their
joint income under federal law and then import it to their state returns
for adjustments—same-sex couples were often forced to calculate their
taxes in three steps.50 First, they determined their federal tax liability
as single individuals.51 Second, they determined their hypothetical
joint income under federal law—a dummy return that would never be
filed.52 Third, they imported the numbers from their dummy return
to their state tax returns in order to calculate their state income.53 As
a result, filing was time consuming, complicated, and sometimes
expensive.54 Though burdensome, this consequence of disconformity
arguably helped push national policy by setting the stage for judicial
changes to federal law.
In 2013, the Supreme Court noted this context in United States v.
Windsor.55 In its analysis of the consequences of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage for federal purposes
as between a man and a woman, the Court observed that “[i]t forces
them to follow a complicated procedure to file their state and federal
taxes jointly.”56 Of course, it was not DOMA, standing alone, that
created this complexity—the complexity arose from states’ deliberate
disconformity from federal tax law. Ultimately, the Court held in
Windsor that failure to treat same-sex marriages the same as oppositesex marriages was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.57
Following that ruling, the Internal Revenue Service announced
that same-sex couples who were married under state law would be
permitted to file jointly under federal law.58 Two years later, in
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See Layser, supra note 42, at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
Id. at 773.
Id. at 775.
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201–02.
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Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court ruled that the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protect same-sex
marriage.59 Though recent Supreme Court decisions have cast some
doubt on Obergefell and the future of same-sex marriage,60 there is no
question that same-sex spouses can file jointly for both state and
federal tax purposes under current law. Thus, this historical example
provides powerful evidence of the reverse federalism potential of
disconformity to help correct injustices under federal law.
With this background in mind, the remainder of this Article will
take a closer look at reverse federalism in the context of current law.
This Article will focus on a handful of particularly clear examples of
laws that have the potential to help (or harm) low-income
communities: the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit,
and the Opportunity Zones tax preference. The federal experience of
these laws has revealed areas of potential, as well as significant
limitations, in their capacity to benefit low-income communities. For
reasons to be explained more fully in Part IV below, disconformity to
substantive aspects of these federal laws may help improve their statelevel outcomes. In addition, the outcomes of some of these laws may
be affected by states’ approach to election conformity and
administrative conformity.
III. THE CASES: CONFORMITY TO THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT,
CHILD TAX CREDIT, AND OPPORTUNITY ZONES
A. Conformity to Federal Tax Credits: Earned Income Tax Credit and
Child Tax Credit
The federal government commonly uses tax preferences to
deliver financial assistance to low-income individuals.61 For this
purpose, tax credits have several advantages over other forms of tax
preferences. For example, tax credits are often more equitable than
tax deductions. Tax deductions work by reducing a taxpayer’s taxable
income. As a result, they are only available to taxpayers that have
taxable income to reduce. Many low-income individuals do not have

59

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).
See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 144 S. Ct. 2228, 2301 (2022)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s
substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.”).
61
See generally Tahk, supra note 2, at 796–820.
60
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taxable income, making deductions valueless to them.62 Less
obviously, tax deductions are always more valuable to taxpayers with
high marginal tax rates than to taxpayers with lower marginal tax
rates.63 This means that, when progressive tax rates apply, the
deductions will be more valuable to higher income taxpayers than to
lower income taxpayers. Tax credits, on the other hand, reduce
taxpayers’ tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis. For this reason, they
are not affected by taxpayers’ marginal tax rates and have equal value
to higher income and lower income taxpayers.
Of course, there is a catch: a taxpayer who has little or no tax
liability—those same taxpayers who had little use for deductions—may
not be able to use all their tax credits either.64 For example, assume a
low-income taxpayer owes $100 in taxes before applying tax credits. If
the taxpayer is entitled to a $350 tax credit, then they may be unable
to use $250 of the credit (the taxpayer can reduce their tax liability to
zero, but no further). To solve this dilemma, some tax credits targeted
to low-income taxpayers are structured as “refundable” tax credits.
Refundable tax credits are not limited by a taxpayer’s tax liability.65 In
the example above, the taxpayer would simply receive a check or bank
deposit from the government equal to $250 in a transaction that
“resembles other tax refunds in administration and public
perception.”66
Two federal tax credits that target low-income taxpayers and have
refundable features are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),67
which is fully refundable, and the Child Tax Credit (CTC),68 which is
partially refundable. This section provides a brief overview of each and
explains how states have incorporated them into their tax codes. Later
Parts will consider potential social justice reforms through strategic
disconformity to these laws.

62
Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28–29 (2006).
63
Id. at 24.
64
See id. at 28–29.
65
Id. at 24.
66
Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit
Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 530 (2013).
67
I.R.C. § 32.
68
I.R.C. § 24.
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1. Earned Income Tax Credit
“The EITC is a refundable tax credit that supplements the
earnings of low-income workers,”69 and as such, it is a key component
of the country’s social safety net. Briefly, the EITC provides a tax credit
to qualifying low-income taxpayers in an amount equal to a percentage
of their “earned income” for the taxable year.70 Earned income
generally includes “wages, salaries, tips, and other employee
compensation” plus the “taxpayer’s net earnings from selfemployment.”71 The size of the tax credit varies depending on the
number of “qualifying children” in the taxpayer’s household.72 In
2022, the maximum tax credit available to taxpayers with no children
was $560,73 an amount that only partially offsets the taxpayer’s payroll
tax liability.74 The credit amount increases with the number of
children in the taxpayer’s household, with the maximum credit
available to families with three or more children set at $6,935 for the
2022 tax year.75 At low income levels, the dollar amount of the credit
increases as earned income increases, regardless of the number of
children in the taxpayer’s household.76
69

Greene, supra note 66, at 530.
I.R.C. § 32(a). To be eligible for the EITC, a taxpayer must (i) have a qualifying
child, or (ii) (a) has its “principal place of abode” in the United States for more than
half the taxable year, (b) is between 25 and 64 years old, and (c) is not a dependent of
another taxpayer. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A). “[N]onresident alien individual[s]” are not
eligible for the EITC. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(D). The maximum income level for eligible
taxpayers varies by the number of children in the household and is based on filing
status. I.R.C. § 32(b). For single or head of household filers in 2022, income must be
less than: (a) No children: $16,480, (b) One child: $43,492, (c) Two children: $49,399,
(d) Three or more children: $53,057. Rev. Proc. 2021-45 § 3.06. For married filing
jointly in 2022, income must be less than: (a) No children: $22,610, (b) One child:
$49,622, (c) Two children: $55,529, (d) Three or more children: $59,187. Id.
71
I.R.C. § 32(c)(2).
72
See I.R.C. § 32(b). With some exceptions, the phrase “qualifying child” includes
the taxpayer’s children, or a “brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer
or a descendant of any such relative,” assuming certain conditions are met. I.R.C. §§
32(c)(3)(A), 152(c). To be eligible, the child generally must (i) live with the taxpayer
for more than half the taxable year, (ii) be under 19 (or a student under age 24), and
(iii) must not have filed a joint return with a spouse. Id.
73
Rev. Proc. 2021-45 § 3.06.
74
Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Low-End Regressivity, 72 TAX L. REV. 1, 15 (2018).
75
Rev. Proc. 2021–45 § 3.06.
76
See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV 533, 541–43 (1994). The credit amount, however, is
subject to a cap, and once the taxpayer’s income reaches a threshold level, the credit
begins to phase out and ultimately reduces to zero. Id.
70

2022]

TAX (DIS)CONFORMITY

427

During the 2020 tax year, the EITC delivered approximately $60
billion of tax credits to twenty-five million low-income workers.77 The
average amount of EITCs received by eligible taxpayers was about
$2,411,78 with some receiving as much as $6,728.79 The EITC lifts
“millions of families out of poverty and reduce[s] poverty for many
others.”80 The law is associated with the improvement of children’s
well-being, including “improved infant health and increased math and
reading test scores.”81 It is also “broadly associated with increasing
labor force participation among single mothers.”82
Though
researchers have critiqued aspects of the EITC, with some going as far
as to describe the program as a “broken” safety net, EITC recipients’
own assessment of the program is “overwhelmingly positive.”83
Recipients feel favorably about the program not only because it
“provides much-needed financial relief, but also because it allow[s]
them to feel . . . like ‘a real American.’”84
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of
2022, thirty states and the District of Columbia offer some form of
state-level EITC that supplements the federal law.85 For the reasons
explained above, tax credits like the EITC are not automatically
incorporated into state tax laws, and the states that have EITCs all took
affirmative steps to adopt their own versions.86 Despite this, many
states simply specify that the state EITC equals a percentage of the
EITC available under federal law.87 In doing so, these states effectively
77

EITC Fast Facts, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.eitc.irs.gov/partnertoolkit/basic-marketing-communication-materials/eitc-fast-facts/eitc-fast-facts
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2022).
78
Id.
79
Income Limits and Range of EITC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc-central/about-eitc/income-limits-and-range-of-eitc
/income-limits-and-range-of-eitc (last visited Aug. 1, 2022).
80
Kleiman, supra note 74, at 11.
81
Id. (footnotes omitted).
82
Id. at 11–12.
83
Greene, supra note 66, at 538.
84
Id. at 539.
85
EITC Enactments 2009–2022, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-earned-income-taxcreadit-enactments.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2022).
86
See supra Part 0.A.
87
State and Local Backgrounders: State Earned Income Tax Credits, URB. INST.,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-localfinance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-earned-income-tax-credits (last
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conform to all aspects of the federal law, including eligibility rules and
administrative requirements. In Part IV, this Article will identify areas
in which disconformity may help correct problems with the federal
program, but it is worth noting here that several states already depart
from the federal model in ways that respond to social justice critiques.
For example, some states make the tax credits available to populations
that are ineligible to claim the federal tax credits.88 These departures
will be discussed in Part IV below.
2. Child Tax Credits
The CTC is another federal tax credit program that provides
important financial assistance to many low-income families with
children.89 Like the EITC, the CTC requires that taxpayers have
“earned income” to claim the credit, thereby limiting the program to
working families.90 Assuming the taxpayer is eligible, the CTC provides
maximum tax credits of $2,000 per qualifying child, and it is partially
refundable in amounts up to $1,500.91 The government calls the
refundable portion of the CTC the “additional child tax credit.”92
Although the CTC is not limited to low-income families, the size of the
credit phases out for high-income couples, beginning at $400,000 for
married-filing-jointly taxpayers.93
According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, as of
2022, “[n]ine states have already enacted and funded a CTC . . . and
states continue to enact new credits and improve existing ones.”94 In
at least two of those states—Oklahoma and Colorado—the state CTC
is always calculated as a percentage of the federal CTC.95 In those
visited Oct. 4, 2022). The percentage varies, and “[i]n tax year 2022, state credits as a
percentage of the federal EITC ranged from a refundable 3 percent in Montana to a
nonrefundable 104.17 percent in South Carolina.” Id.
88
Id.
89
See Tahk, supra note 2, at 804–05.
90
Kleiman, supra note 3, at 536.
91
I.R.C. § 24; Rev. Proc. 2021-45 §3.05 (applying inflation adjustments to specify
that the refundable amount in 2022 is $1500). [Sec. 3.05]
92
What Is the Child Tax Credit?, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.pgpf.org/budget-basics/what-is-the-child-tax-credit.
93
Id.
94
Samantha Waxman & Iris Hinh, States Should Create and Expand Child Tax Credits,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 22, 2022, 10:00 AM), https://www.cbpp.org
/blog/states-should-create-and-expand-child-tax-credits.
95
OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2357(B)(2) (2022) (providing for a tax credit equal to 5
percent of the CTC allowed under the federal Internal Revenue Code); COLO. REV.
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states, the CTC effectively conforms to the federal law in its entirety.
But most states that have enacted CTCs have adopted their own
formulas for calculating the credits.96 Nevertheless, many states that
use their own formulas have retained the federal eligibility
requirements, maintaining a high degree of conformity to federal
law.97 In Part IV below, this Article highlights areas in which states
might consider departing from the federal model, including different
eligibility requirements.
B. Conformity and the Opportunity Zones Tax Preference
In contrast to tax credits like the EITC and CTC, which direct
benefits to low-income individuals, some tax laws are designed to
improve the places where low-income people live and work.98 Often,
these laws are designed to provide assistance to real estate developers
and other business owners.99 A recent—highly controversial—
example of such a place-based policy is the federal Opportunity Zones
law.100 This program provides tax preferences for investment in
designated areas called “qualified opportunity zones.”101 When it
emerged with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, the law’s backers
claimed it would benefit low-income communities by promoting
investment in their neighborhoods.102 Since then, the law has drawn

STATS. § 39-22-129 (2021) (providing for a state CTC calculated as a percentage of the
federal CTC). See also I.R.C. § 24 (federal child tax credit).
96
State Tax Credits, TAX CREDITS FOR WORKERS AND FAMILIES,
https://www.taxcreditsforworkersandfamilies.org/state-tax-credits (last visited Oct. 4,
2022). See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17054 (West 2021) (specifying dollar amount
for the dependent exemption credit); IDAHO CODE § 63-3029L (2012) (specifying
dollar amount for the state CTC); N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(c-1) (2022) (specifying dollar
amount for the empire state child credit).
97
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 63-3029L (2012) (incorporating the definition of
“qualifying child” from federal law); N.Y. TAX LAW § 606 (2022) (incorporating the
definition of “qualifying child” from federal law).
98
Layser, Geographic Inequality, supra note 3, at 1–2.
99
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 42 (Low-income housing tax credit); I.R.C. § 45D (New markets
tax credit); I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Special rules for capital gains invested in opportunity
zones).
100
See I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2.
101
I.R.C. § 1400Z-1.
102
See generally DAVID WESSEL, ONLY THE RICH CAN PLAY (2021).
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extensive criticism from academics, 103 anti-poverty advocates,104 and
journalists,105 many of whom argue that the law is unlikely to help
residents of low-income communities.
Despite the critiques of Opportunity Zones, twenty-eight states
have incorporated the federal Opportunity Zones law into their state
laws without significant changes.106 Eleven states automatically
incorporated the federal Opportunity Zones law through rolling
conformity, and seventeen states took affirmative steps to conform
through static or selective conformity processes.107 Another nine states
also conform to the federal Opportunity Zones law, but with statespecific modifications.108 In states that conform to the federal
Opportunity Zones law, taxpayers with cash derived from capital gains
can invest it in an Opportunity Fund to receive state-level capital gains
tax deferrals and exemptions. As a result, the state laws effectively
supplement the federal law, making Opportunity Zones investment
more valuable than it would be under federal law alone.

103
See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 3, at 182; Layser, Geographic Inequality, supra note 3, at
51–56; De Barbieri, supra note 3, at 92.
104
See, e.g., Heather Tirado Gilligan, Philadelphia Colleges Are Using Trump’s
Opportunity Zones to Speed Up Gentrification, TALK POVERTY (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://talkpoverty.org/2020/11/02/philadelphia-colleges-using-trumpsopportunity-zones-speed-gentrification; Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity
Zones Loom, as Do Risks of Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-ofopportunity-zones-loom-as-do-risks-of-large-scale-tax.
105
See, e.g., WESSEL, supra note 102; Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, An Opportunity
for the Rich, WNYC STUDIOS: TRUMP, INC. (June 19, 2019), https://www.wnycstudios.org
/podcasts/trumpinc/episodes/trump-inc-opportunity-for-rich;
Robert
Frank,
“Opportunity Zones” Fall Short on Helping Low-Income Communities, Study Finds, CNBC
(June 17, 2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/opportunity-zonesfall-short-on-helping-low-income-communities-study.html; Kathryn Kranhold, There’s
No Evidence That Opportunity Zones Benefit Low-Income Residents and Their Neighborhoods,
MOTHER JONES (June 29, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/06
/theres-no-evidence-that-opportunity-zones-benefit-low-income-residents-and-theirneighborhoods; Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html; Eric
Lipton & Jesse Drucker, Symbol of ‘80s Greed Stands to Profit From Trump Tax Break for Poor
Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/business
/michael-milken-trump-opportunity-zones.html.
106
MICHELLE LAYSER, MULTI-STATE SURVEY OF STATE OPPORTUNITY ZONES LAWS 1–9
(2022), https://doi.org/10.13012/B2IDB-4303513_V1.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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By making the Opportunity Zones incentive more valuable to
developers, conformity may contribute to an increase in Opportunity
Zone investment—including investment that may not benefit lowincome communities. For example, if the Opportunity Zones tax
preferences are merely giveaways to investors as some critics suggest,
then conformity by states only sweetens the deals. If Opportunity Zone
investment contributes to gentrification by accelerating investment in
gentrifying communities, then conformity by states may accelerate the
process. In short, conformity by states amplifies the extent that the
federal Opportunity Zones law fails to promote social justice goals.
***
The federal EITC, CTC, and Opportunity Zones laws are
examples of federal laws to which states often conform, sometimes with
modification, but frequently without. To the extent that these laws
produce desirable outcomes, such conformity is an administratively
efficient way to double down on those benefits, amplifying their
positive outcomes within state borders. Such administrative simplicity
is a major driver of federal-state conformity. But a more mindful
approach to federal-state disconformity, which is informed by the federal
experience, has the potential to promote more just outcomes in areas
where the federal law falls short. The next section examines
disconformity as a social justice reform strategy, using the EITC, CTC,
and Opportunity Zones laws as case studies.
IV. DISCONFORMITY AS A STRATEGY TO IMPROVE THE EITC, CTC, AND
OPPORTUNITY ZONES
A. Reforming the EITC
1. Lessons and Critiques
Anti-poverty advocates widely view the EITC as a successful
program; the most common critiques focus on its scope. Despite its
benefits, the federal EITC is not available to all taxpayers. Among the
excluded groups are childless workers under the age of twenty-five and
those who lack a social security number.109 These restrictions prevent
many young low-income taxpayers and most immigrant workers from
claiming EITC benefits. Moreover, taxpayers without qualifying

109

I.R.C. § 32(c)(A)(ii)(II) (childless adults must have attained age twenty-five to
claim the EITC); I.R.C. § 32(m) (specifying that the identification requirements in
I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(E) and (c)(3)(D) can only be met with a social security number).
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children are only eligible for a limited amount of EITCs.110 Advocates
for EITC reform have often called for expansions that would allow the
EITC to better serve these populations, and Congress temporarily
enacted versions of some of those reforms during the COVID-19
pandemic.111 The American Rescue Plan of 2021 reduced the
eligibility age to nineteen for most taxpayers, and increased the size of
the credit for workers without qualifying children.112
In addition, some otherwise eligible married taxpayers may be
barred from the program if they do not file using a joint tax return.113
This feature of the EITC has drawn criticism from observers who point
out that some married taxpayers have compelling reasons to file
separately from their spouses.114 Many of these reasons relate to
nontax circumstances. For example, a taxpayer may be separated or
estranged from their spouse, but still legally married.115 A taxpayer
may be a victim of spousal abuse or abandonment, or he or she may
have a spouse who refuses to sign a joint return.116 Under such
circumstances, low-income taxpayers face a difficult choice: attempt to
file jointly with potentially harmful consequences, or file separately
and forgo the federal EITC. During the COVID-19 pandemic, these
restrictions were lifted for some separated spouses.117 Though a full

110

I.R.C. § 32(b); Kleiman, supra note 3, at 546.
See generally Kleiman, supra note 3 (discussing temporary expansions of the EITC
and CTC programs during the COVID-19 pandemic).
112
Looking Ahead: How the American Rescue Plan Affects 2021 Taxes, Part 1, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (June 2, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/looking-ahead-howthe-american-rescue-plan-affects-2021-taxes-part-1.
113
See I.R.C. § 32(d)(1); James Maule, Family and Household Transactions (Portfolio
513), BLOOMBERG TAX, https://pro.bloombergtax.com/portfolio/family-andhousehold-transactions-portfolio-513 (last visited Oct. 4, 2022).
114
Fred B. Brown, Permitting Abused Spouses to Claim the Earned Income Tax Credit in
Separate Returns, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 453, 454–55 (2016).
115
Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Joint Winners, Separate Losers: Proposals to Ease the Sting for
Married Taxpayers Filing Separately, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 399, 457 (2016).
116
Id. at 411–12; see generally Brown, supra note 114 (analyzing the difficulties in
claiming the EITC faced by abused spouses).
117
See COVID Tax Tip 2022-31: Changes to the Earned Income Tax Credit for the 2022
Filing Season, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom
/changes-to-the-earned-income-tax-credit-for-the-2022-filing-season. See also I.R.C.
32(d)(2) (permitting married spouses to be treated as single under the EITC as long
as the taxpayer (i) does not file a joint tax return with another individual, (ii) resides
with a qualifying child of the individual for more than half of the taxable year, and
(iii) has been living apart from their spouse for at least six months or is legally
separated).
111
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analysis of program outcomes under the emergency expansions of the
EITC during COVID is not yet available, these changes, and those
previously mentioned, have been celebrated by anti-poverty
advocates.118
2. Disconformity as a Reform Strategy
The EITC confers meaningful benefits to low-income taxpayers,
and conformity to the federal law allows states to enhance those
benefits through supplemental tax benefits. To the extent that states
calculate the EITC as a percentage of the federal program, such
conformity has obvious advantages of reducing compliance burdens
for taxpayers and administrative burdens for the states.119 In other
words, piggybacking onto the federal law has the potential to amplify
positive outcomes under the EITC with clear benefits to the states.
Nevertheless, states can also improve upon the federal EITC by
choosing not to conform to federal eligibility requirements, filing
election requirements, and social security number requirements.
In fact, some states have already begun to adopt these departures.
According to an Urban Institute survey, seven states make EITC
benefits available to childless workers under age twenty-five.120 In 2020,
two states—California and Colorado—decoupled from the social
security number requirement, permitting immigrants with Individual
Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) to claim state EITCs.121
Since then, five other states—Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon,
and Washington—have made similar changes to their state laws,122
suggesting that reform efforts in California and Colorado may have
started a national trend—an example of reverse federalism at work.
That said, it is worth noting that ITINs are issued by the federal
government, which has been experiencing significant processing

118
See, e.g., Areeba Haider & Galen Hendricks, Now Is the Time to Permanently Expand
the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 21, 2021),
https://americanprogress.org/article/now-time-permanently-expand-child-taxcredit-earned-income-tax-credit.
119
See Mason, supra note 7, at 1269 (“Assessing state income taxes upon the federal
tax base eases states’ legislative and enforcement burdens, and it reduces taxpayers’
compliance burdens.”).
120
These states include Colorado, California, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and New Mexico. State and Local Backgrounders: State Earned Income Tax Credits,
supra note 87.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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delays in issuing new ITINs.123 As these states work to extend benefits
to their immigrant populations, it may be worth adopting alternative
documentation options that are less reliant on federal administration.
In addition, states could eliminate filing election conformity and
permit married taxpayers to claim the EITC even if they file separately.
In states with filing election conformity, taxpayers must use the same
filing status for state taxes as they use for federal purposes. This means
taxpayers who filed jointly under federal law—such as to claim the
EITC—must also file jointly under state law. For most low-income
taxpayers, this outcome is probably consistent with what they would
choose absent election conformity. This is because joint tax filing
often offers more favorable tax brackets than married-filing-separately
status, allowing taxpayers to lower their effective tax rates.124 Some
taxpayers, however, may prefer to avoid joint filing for the reasons
described above.125 Through disconformity, states can provide these
taxpayers with more freedom to choose their election status without
sacrificing valuable EITC benefits.
B. Reforming the CTC
1. Lessons and Critiques
Two features of the CTC have drawn criticism from scholars and
advocates. The first is its partial refundability feature.126 Unlike the
EITC, which is fully refundable, the CTC is only partially refundable to
low-income taxpayers.127 This means that the lowest income taxpayers
may not receive the full benefit from the tax credit.128 The second
feature that tends to draw criticism from advocates is the work

123

United States–Delays Occurring for Issuance of ITINs, Certificates of Coverage, KPMG
(Dec. 15, 2021), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2021/12/flash-alert2021-307.html.
124
Alstott, supra note 76, at 577 n.164.
125
See supra notes 113–117.
126
Wendy A. Bach, Poor Support/Rich Support: (Re)Viewing the American Social Welfare
State, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 495, 525 (2017) (noting that “the CTC is not available to the
poorest households” because it is only partially refundable); SUNNY FROTHINGHAM ET
AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STRENGTHENING THE CHILD TAX CREDIT WOULD PROVIDE
GREATER
ECONOMIC
STABILITY
FOR
MILLENNIAL
PARENTS
4
(2015),
https://cdn.genprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/27122228
/CTCmillennials-brief.pdf (“Because the CTC is only partially refundable, it does not
reach many of the lowest-income children.”).
127
Bach, supra note 126, at 525.
128
See Bach, supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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requirement. Specifically, the refundable portion of the CTC is
calculated as a percentage of a taxpayer’s earned income in excess of
inflation-adjusted $2,500.129 The phrase “earned income” is defined in
I.R.C. § 32 and generally includes compensation income.130 Critics
argue that this work requirement limits the laws’ capacity to mitigate
childhood poverty for children whose parents are unemployed.131
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the American Rescue Plan
temporarily eliminated the CTC’s work requirement and increased the
amounts to $3,600 for children under age six and to $3,000 for
children ages six through seventeen.132 It also made the credit fully
refundable, significantly increasing its value to low-income taxpayers.
A survey of CTC recipients in 2021 showed that 25 percent of recipients
spent the extra money on mortgages or rent, a clear illustration of the
importance of such assistance for maintaining housing stability.133
2. Disconformity as a Reform Strategy
The expanded federal CTC is no longer available to taxpayers,
and many families may once again face economic insecurity.
Notwithstanding the expiration of the federal law, states can make
their own CTC programs permanent and can use the emergency
legislation as a model. In fact, several states enacted or expanded their
own state-level CTCs in 2021 or 2022, and many of those laws will be

129

See I.R.C. §§ 24(d)(1)(B) (calculating taxpayers’ refundable CTC with
referenced to “earned income” (within the meaning of the earned income tax credit
rules) over $3,000); 24(h)(6) (lowering the earned income segment threshold amount
to $2,500 for years 2018 through 2025).
130
See I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A) (defining earned income as “wages, salaries, tips, and
other employee compensation” and certain net earnings from self-employment).
131
FROTHINGTHAM ET AL., supra note 126, at 4 (stating that the CTC’s minimum
earnings requirement “excludes many families whose budgets are the tightest, such as
parents who are underemployed or looking for work”).
132
See I.R.C. §§ 24(i)(3) (increasing the credit amount); 24(i)(1) (eliminating the
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permanent.134 For example, in 2022, Vermont enacted a new, fully
refundable CTC worth $1,000 per qualifying child five-years-old and
younger.135 That same year, New Jersey enacted a similar refundable
CTC that provides up to $500 per child five-years-old and younger.136
In enacting state CTCs, states should consider making the CTC fully
refundable and available to taxpayers without earned income. These
departures from the federal law, which are modeled after the
successful COVID-19 emergency legislation, would help serve
taxpayers who do not have full access to the federal CTC under current
law.
C. Reforming Opportunity Zones
1. Lessons and Critiques
A growing body of research suggests that Opportunity Zones
investment often does not flow to the neighborhoods that need it
most.137 In addition, the projects subsidized through the Opportunity
Zones program tend to be market rent real estate projects that are
inaccessible to many low-income families that rely on below-market,
“affordable” rentals.138 For these reasons, many critics worry that
Opportunity Zones are, at best, a giveaway to real estate developers—a
134
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subsidy for investment that would have happened without the tax law.
At worst, Opportunity Zones may accelerate gentrification in some
neighborhoods, potentially displacing low-income residents as
property values increase the cost of rents and property taxes.
2. Disconformity as a Reform Strategy
If states fully decouple from the federal Opportunity Zones law,
such as by eliminating all state-level capital gains preferences for
investment in Opportunity Zones, they may chill Opportunity Zone
investment in their state. To the extent that simply slowing
Opportunity Zones investment is the goal, this may be an effective
strategy, as at least some investors are likely to migrate to other states
that provide state-level benefits. State leaders, however, are often
reluctant to enact policies that may be perceived as driving away
investment and, more importantly, jobs.139 In fact, there is evidence
that some state leaders initially resisted enacting state-level
Opportunity Zones laws, but ultimately yielded to pressure from the
business community.140
Given this political reality, an alternative option for states may be
to modify their state Opportunity Zones laws to make it more likely
that the laws will benefit low-income communities. Here, the version
of a state-level Opportunity Zones law enacted in Maryland may serve
as a useful template. Maryland provides supplemental tax benefits to
businesses that maintain accountability to opportunity zone residents
through representation on their governing or advisory boards, or
through use of a community benefit agreement (CBA) or strategic
industry partnership negotiated with community groups.141
Community benefits agreements are contracts between developers and
community coalitions that require the developer to provide “economic
benefits such as affordable housing, local hiring, and living wages to
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communities where major developments are located.”142 State-level
modifications like these may help provide accountability to members
of the targeted community, a feature that is notably absent from the
federal law. In addition, states might consider adding conditions to
their state-level Opportunity Zones laws that would require
opportunity zone businesses to hire, serve, or house residents of the
targeted communities. Such changes may help mitigate harms—and
even increase the benefits—of the federal Opportunity Zones to lowincome communities.
V. CONCLUSION
In the current political and legal environment, the greatest
potential for social justice reform—including tax-based reforms—may
be at the state level. For this reason, it is essential for reformers to
understand how states can help drive national policy change. To that
end, this Article has revisited a familiar feature of state tax systems,
federal-state tax conformity and disconformity, applying a reverse
federalism framework. In doing so, it has introduced a new theory of
disconformity that shifts the focus away from its defensive role within
a federalist system, and it highlights the capacity for disconformity to
serve as a powerful corrective to federal law. To demonstrate this
capacity, this Article has described how states can learn from the
federal experience with the federal Earned Income Tax Credit, Child
Tax Credit, and Opportunity Zones tax preference to implement
strategic departures from the federal model. Strategic departures like
these have the potential to promote nationwide social justice reform
initiated at the state level.
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